Virtue and argument: Taking character into account by Bowell, Tracy & Kingsbury, Justine
 
© Tracy Bowell and Justine Kingsbury. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 1 
(2013), pp. 22-32. 
Virtue and Argument:  
Taking Character into Account 
 
TRACY BOWELL 
 
Philosophy Programme 
University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton 
New Zealand 
taboo@waikato.ac.nz 
 
JUSTINE KINGSBURY 
 
Philosophy Programme 
University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton 
New Zealand 
justinek@waikato.ac.nz 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper we consider 
the prospects for an account of good 
argument that takes the character of 
the arguer into consideration. We 
conclude that although there is much 
to be gained by identifying the vir-
tues of the good arguer and by con-
sidering the ways in which these 
virtues can be developed in our-
selves and in others, virtue argumen-
tation theory does not offer a plausi-
ble alternative definition of good 
argument. 
 
 
Résumé: Dans cet article, nous ex-
aminons les avantages d'une notion 
de bon argument qui prend en con-
sidération le caractère d’un argu-
mentateur. Nous concluons que bien 
qu'il y ait beaucoup à gagner à iden-
tifier les vertus d’un bon argumenta-
teur et à tenir compte des façons 
dont ces vertus peuvent être 
développées en nous-mêmes et chez 
les autres, la théorie des vertus dans 
l’argumentation n'offre pas une al-
ternative plausible aux critères de 
bon argument. 
Keywords: argument, argumentation, character, virtue argumentation theory, 
virtue epistemology, virtue. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper we consider the prospects for an account of good 
argument that takes the character of the arguer into considera-
tion. Andrew Aberdein (2010) has defended a virtue-theoretic 
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approach to argumentation that builds on work in both virtue 
ethics and virtue epistemology, and a trend in this direction can 
also be seen in Battaly (2010) and Cohen (2009). Virtue episte-
mology defines knowledge partly in terms of the exercise of 
epistemic virtues by the knower; virtue argumentation theory 
hopes to define good argument partly in terms of the exercise of 
argumentational virtues by the arguer. We conclude that al-
though there is much to be gained by identifying the virtues of 
the good arguer and those of the good evaluator of arguments, 
and by considering the ways in which these virtues can be de-
veloped in ourselves and in others, virtue argumentation theory 
does not offer a plausible alternative to a more standard agent-
neutral account of good argument.  
 Here is the view of argument, and in particular of good 
argument, which we take as our starting point. When we put 
forward an argument, we seek to rationally persuade others to 
accept our conclusion.1 Given this, it seems natural for an ac-
count of good argument to center on the ability of an argument 
to provide its intended audience with good reasons to accept its 
conclusion. A good argument is an argument that provides, via 
its premises, sufficient justification for believing its conclusion 
to be true or highly probable, or for accepting that the course of 
action it advises is one that certainly or highly probably should 
be taken. This account of good argument has both logical and 
epistemic elements.   
 Of course, this is not an account of good argument that a 
virtue argumentation theorist would accept. The virtue theorist 
thinks that what makes an argument good is that the person pre-
senting it has argued well, whereas we think that what makes it 
the case that an arguer has argued well is that they have pre-
sented an argument that is good in the sense described in the 
previous paragraph. It would be question-begging to assume that 
ours is the correct account. However, we think that the intuitions 
                                     
1 This view of argument is widespread. One well-known source is Govier 
1989. We realize, however, that it is not a conception of argument that con-
nects with all projects in argumentation theory.  In particular, it does not 
neatly align with the view of arguments as best defined in terms of the dia-
logical and dialectical contexts in which they are presented (see, for example, 
Walton 1990). Note however that there are some affinities between our view 
and the dialogical view in that we do define argument in terms of the inten-
tions of an arguer with respect to their interlocutor, which opens up the pos-
sibility that matters of character and trust are relevant (which they could not 
be if we considered an argument to be, for example, just an abstract structure 
of propositions). A discussion of the relationship between our approach and 
the dialogical view of argument is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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about the purpose of arguments from which it arises are deep-
seated, and that any agent-centered account that cannot accom-
modate them will be unable to offer a complete account of good 
argument. 
 
 
2.  Virtue epistemology 
 
A character-based account of knowledge explains what it is for 
an agent to know that p in terms of that agent’s exercise of the 
relevant epistemic virtues in coming to truly believe that p. Vir-
tue-based epistemic theories divide into two main strands, reli-
abilist and responsibilist, differentiated by what they count as 
the relevant epistemic virtues. The former, the roots of which lie 
in more standard reliabilist approaches to knowledge, was first 
developed by Ernest Sosa. According to a virtue-reliabilist ac-
count of knowledge, the relevant epistemic virtues include per-
ceptual abilities, introspection, memory and the ability to reason 
deductively and inductively (Sosa 1991). The responsibilist al-
ternative was first developed by Lorraine Code (who coined the 
label) and by James Montmarquet (1987). For the principal ele-
ments of her account of the overarching virtue of epistemic re-
sponsibility, Code returns to the Aristotelian intellectual virtues 
of wisdom, intelligence and prudence (1984, 40) fleshing her 
central idea out thus: 
 
 The intellectually virtuous person… is one who 
finds value in knowing and understanding how things 
really are. S/he resists the temptation to live with partial 
explanations where fuller ones are attainable, the tempta-
tion to live in fantasy or in a world of dream or illusion, 
considering it better to know, despite the tempting com-
fort and complacency that a life of fantasy or illusion (or 
well-tinged with fantasy or illusion) can offer. (Code 
1984, 44)  
 
 The responsibilist approach is delineated from the reli-
abilist one by its emphasis on intellectual virtues the exercise of 
which involves the agent’s choice (consequently, the agent is 
responsible for exercising or not exercising them). But the de-
lineation is not clear cut, because in the case of some reliabilist 
virtues, one might choose whether or not to exercise them, and 
making the right choice in such a situation (or failing to make it) 
might itself constitute a virtuous (or vicious) act.  (For example, 
one might be a good perceiver and have a good memory, but on 
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some particular occasion fail to make the effort to mentally re-
trieve the details of some event which one has observed.) While 
the responsibilist and reliabilist strands have developed as com-
peting accounts of intellectual virtue, some contributions to the 
literature explore the possibility of an account which draws 
upon both reliabilist and responsibilist resources (e.g. Battaly 
2000, Lepock 2010). Linda Zagzebski has developed perhaps 
the most complete account of intellectual virtues, and although 
she identifies her theory as a responsibilist one, she includes a 
number of characteristics that are better classified as reliabilist 
(Zagzebski 1996, 114).  
 
 
3.  Virtue argumentation theory 
 
Recently, as agent and character-based strands of epistemology 
have become established, some philosophers interested in argu-
mentation have begun to consider whether a similar agent-
oriented turn has the potential to improve upon our understand-
ing of what constitutes good argument. Among these, Andrew 
Aberdein has developed an initial framework for a virtue-based 
account of argumentation that has some similarities with virtue-
theoretic approaches to knowledge in a (roughly) responsibilist 
vein (2010). On Aberdein’s account, the proper exercise of the 
argumentative virtues would become constitutive of the norms 
of argument.  
 To anyone comfortably embedded in a more or less agent-
neutral approach to argument appraisal, a move towards includ-
ing consideration of the characteristics of arguers is likely to 
seem counter-intuitive. Indeed, many arguments often regarded 
as fallacious are held to be so precisely because they involve 
appeals to claims about arguers, and such claims are deemed to 
be irrelevant to the truth of their conclusions. On the face of it, 
an argument that is structurally strong and has premises that the 
appraiser of the argument has good reason to accept is not 
weakened by claims about the character or competence of the 
arguer. Any shift in the direction of an agent-based approach 
may itself appear to commit some kind of illegitimate ad 
hominem move.  
 Although the established approach to argument evaluation 
leans strongly towards agent-neutrality, it does allow that there 
are circumstances in which facts about a person’s character are 
relevant to whether or not we should believe what that person 
says: there are legitimate ad hominem arguments.  If we have 
reason to think that X is habitually dishonest, we should not ac-
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cept X’s claim solely on the grounds that X has made it.  If we 
have reason to think that Y is unreliable about the kind of thing 
about which she is testifying—for example, if Y is making a 
claim about distances on the basis of her perceptions and we 
know that Y’s depth perception is defective—and we have no 
independent reason to believe it, then we should not accept Y’s 
claim. Sometimes, then, pointing out a characteristic of a 
speaker (her lack of some relevant epistemic virtue, either re-
sponsibilist or reliabilist) can undermine her claim.  Likewise, 
when we accept someone’s claim on the grounds that they are 
an authority on the subject in question and we are not competent 
to establish the truth of the claim more directly, the character of 
the person appealed to is in play. A legitimate appeal to author-
ity requires not just that the person is genuinely an authority on 
the subject in question and that there is a high degree of agree-
ment amongst authorities in that area, but also that there is no 
reason to think that the person in question is biased, insincere or 
untrustworthy. These latter conditions open the way to an 
evaluation of her epistemic character. Should that evaluation 
turn out a certain way, it will provide good reason to reject the 
argument from authority.2 
 Legitimate ad hominem arguments provide reasons to 
doubt the truth of a claim on the basis of facts about the person 
making it. It is commonly supposed that it is never reasonable to 
reject an argument on the basis of such facts, however. If the 
CEO of a brewing company provides an argument to the conclu-
sion that the legal drinking age should not be raised, we should 
not reject his argument solely on the grounds that the arguer has 
a vested interest in the conclusion’s being accepted: he has pro-
vided an argument, and we should evaluate that argument on its 
merits. On the face of it, if it is a good argument—either valid or 
inductively forceful, with premises that we have good reason to 
believe—then no facts about the arguer will make it cease to be 
so.  
 However, when someone presents an argument they are in 
general asserting the premises and suggesting, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, that the premises provide good reason to accept the 
                                     
2 Notice that a principle of charity applies here—if we have no good reason 
to do otherwise, we take honesty, sincerity and an intention to believe and 
communicate truths as the default position to be attributed to an arguer. It is 
only when we have good reason to think that one of these characteristics is 
absent that we explicitly treat it as relevant.  
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conclusion. To the extent that we accept the premises purely be-
cause the arguer has asserted them, we should care about the 
veracity of the arguer. In other words, part of what someone 
does when she gives an argument is make substantive claims, 
and so all of the considerations above, about how the character 
of a speaker legitimately influences whether we should believe 
her claims, apply.  This is not to say that the conditional that ap-
pears at the end of the previous paragraph is false: merely that 
considerations involving the character of the arguer may already 
be packed into the “premises that we have good reason to be-
lieve” part of its antecedent.  
 What about the “valid or inductively forceful” part? Is it 
ever the case that facts about the arguer legitimately influence 
our evaluation of the structure of an argument?  On the face of it, 
no. If the conclusion logically follows from the premises, or if 
given the premises, the conclusion is almost certain to be true, 
no fact about the arguer can change that. Likewise, an argument 
which is structurally weak is not redeemed by any facts about 
the epistemic virtues of the arguer. However, consider the fol-
lowing cases. 
 Case 1. It is surely true that facts about the arguer cannot 
undermine the validity of a deductive argument, or make an in-
valid argument valid.  However, perhaps they can be relevant to 
the evaluation of an inductive argument, and not just by casting 
doubt on the truth of the premises. Suppose someone tries to 
convince me that Tom is not fluent in German, on the grounds 
that Tom is a New Zealander and only 2% of New Zealanders 
are fluent in German. This looks like a good enough inductive 
argument. However, there could be information that I lack 
which would undermine the argument without falsifying the 
premises; for example, the information that Tom is the New 
Zealand ambassador to Germany. Given this, facts about the ar-
guer might matter. The arguer has given me no information 
about Tom other than that he is a New Zealander. Is the arguer 
the sort of person who would tell me if he knew that Tom was 
the New Zealand ambassador to Germany, or is he the sort of 
person that would delight in tricking me into thinking that the 
New Zealand ambassador to Germany doesn’t speak German? 
Does he have some particular interest in getting me to believe 
the conclusion which might have lead him to leave out facts 
which, if presented, would make it seem less likely that the con-
clusion is true? What sort of person I take him to be seems to 
matter to whether I should accept his conclusion on the basis of 
his premises. Note that this would not be the case if the arguer 
provided a deductively valid argument (substitute “No New 
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Zealanders speak German” for “Only 2% of New Zealanders 
speak German”). There, provided the premises are true, the con-
clusion must be true too, and so the issue of character can only 
come in if we are deciding whether or not to believe the prem-
ises purely on the arguer’s say-so.  
 Case 2: Just as there are areas in which I defer to experts 
about matters of fact, there might be areas in which I defer to 
experts about matters of logic. Some kinds of reasoning might 
be just too complicated for the untrained to follow. Then it 
makes epistemic sense to defer to someone who is an expert in 
this kind of reasoning. 
 Consider the Monty Hall puzzle. A game-show host indi-
cates three doors and tells a contestant that there is a prize be-
hind one of the doors.  Each of the other doors, he says, has a 
booby prize behind it.  The contestant is then asked to choose a 
door.  When the contestant has made a choice, the host opens 
one of the doors that has not been chosen and reveals that there 
is a booby prize behind it.  The host then asks the contestant 
whether she wishes to revise her choice or not.  The contestant 
makes a decision and then the host opens the door that the con-
testant settles on.  If the prize is behind that door, the contestant 
wins; otherwise not.  The puzzling question is this: should the 
contestant change doors when given the opportunity to do so?  
 When the contestant first picks a door the probability that 
it has the prize behind it is one third.  Before the host opens one 
of the unchosen doors, the contestant already knows that one of 
the unchosen doors has no prize behind it; at least one of the 
unchosen doors must be a loser.  So when the unchosen door is 
opened, she learns nothing new that is relevant to the probability 
that she has already chosen the winning door: that remains at 
one third.  If she swaps she will not choose the door the host has 
just revealed to be a loser; so the opportunity to swap is equiva-
lent to the opportunity of opening both the other doors instead of 
the one she has picked, which doubles her chances of winning.  
So she should swap.3  
 This is highly counterintuitive, and the reasoning is diffi-
cult to get a grip on. Imagine someone who, when the reasons to 
swap are explained to her, kind of understands; just after the ex-
planation has been given, she thinks she can see why swapping 
is the rational thing to do, but she can’t keep the reasons in her 
head—ten minutes later, although she still thinks the rational 
                                     
3 There is an extensive literature on the Monty Hall problem. See, for exam-
ple, Franco-Watkins et. al. (2003) on why the contestant should swap and 
why people find the problem difficult.  
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thing to do is to swap, she can no longer see exactly why that’s 
so.  However, she is informed by reliable experts that the argu-
ment that the contestant should swap is absolutely watertight.  It 
would be better if she could firmly establish this for herself, but 
if she is incapable of it, it is reasonable for her to defer to rele-
vant experts.  
 Case 2 does not seem to be a case in which facts about the 
arguer are legitimately influencing someone’s evaluation of the 
structure of the argument. Rather, she is accepting the conclu-
sion of the argument even though she cannot evaluate the struc-
ture of the argument: because of facts about the arguer, she 
trusts that the arguer would not put forward an argument that 
was structurally bad.  How about Case 1? With inductive argu-
ments, by definition, the fact that the argument is structurally 
strong and the premises are true does not guarantee the truth of 
the conclusion—it is always possible that there is further infor-
mation that would undermine the support that the premises give 
to the conclusion. There seem to be a couple of different ways in 
which one might think about this case. On the one hand, one 
might think that the structure of the argument as stated (2% of 
As are Bs, X is an A, therefore X is a not a B) makes it a strong 
inductive argument, in the sense that if all that you know about 
the situation is what is contained in the premises, you have good 
reason to believe the conclusion. If we think of the argument in 
this way, then facts about the arguer are not relevant to the 
evaluation of the structure of the argument. On the other hand, 
one might think that the argument has an unstated premise, 
something along the lines of “There is nothing unusual about 
Tom that bears on the likelihood of his speaking German,” 
which makes it a much stronger argument. If we take the argu-
ment this second way, then facts about the arguer legitimately 
influence our evaluation, not of the structure of the argument, 
but of the plausibility of the unstated premise. 
 The upshot is that although characteristics of the arguer 
can be relevant to the question of whether or not we should ac-
cept the premises of her argument purely because she has as-
serted them, they do not appear to be relevant to our evaluation 
of the structure of her argument.  What does this mean for the 
virtue argumentation theorist's attempt to give an account of 
good argument that appeals to the character of the arguer?  
 A character-based account of knowledge explains what it 
is for an agent to know that p in terms of that agent’s exercise of 
the relevant epistemic virtues in coming to truly believe that p.  
A full-blown character-based account of good argument would 
explain what it is for an argument to be good in terms of the ar-
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gumentational virtues displayed by the arguer in putting it for-
ward. Thus, on such an account, the virtues exercised by the 
good arguer would become constitutive of the goodness of their 
argument. There are important disanalogies between good ar-
gument and knowledge that suggest that we ought to resist this 
move. While it seems plausible that someone who displays all 
the relevant characteristics, both reliabilist and responsibilist, 
will be able to construct good arguments and be successful at 
appraising the arguments of others, surely a good argument 
could be put forward by someone who lacked those characteris-
tics. Consider someone who puts forward a valid argument with 
true premises but doesn’t see that it is a good argument—
someone who, for instance, has learned to recite a valid syllo-
gism, or someone who doesn’t understand the premises of her 
own argument, or someone who mistakenly thinks that the 
premises of her own argument are false. We would not deny that 
the argument is a good argument; rather, we would say that the 
arguer has accidentally put forward a good argument.4 This con-
trasts with what we would say in the parallel case regarding 
knowledge: we would deny that the person who accidentally ar-
rives at a true belief that p knows that p.   
 There is a way to restore the parallel with virtue episte-
mology: deny that accidentally sound arguments are good argu-
ments, just as accidentally true beliefs are not knowledge. How-
ever, this does not fit with the sense of argument being used 
here. It would force us to say that if two different arguers pre-
sented the same sentences in order to reach the same conclusion 
in the same way, there are actually two different arguments pre-
sent. There are rhetorical and dialectical grounds for embracing 
that conclusion, but not for the purposes at hand. When it comes 
to argument evaluation, the standard view is standard for a rea-
son. It allows us to say that if one person presents a good argu-
ment, another person can use that same argument, confident that 
it will remain so. Virtue argumentation theorists see the differ-
ence but are blind to the sameness. 
 The fact that a good argument can be put forward by an 
argumentationally unvirtuous arguer suggests that in those cases 
                                     
4 While the argument remains a good argument, if the arguer doesn’t have 
good reason to accept her own premises or does not see that the syllogism is 
valid, the arguer herself ought not to be rationally persuaded by her own ar-
gument. However, someone who hears her argument, understands and be-
lieves the premises with good reason should be rationally persuaded by it.  
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in which a good argument is put forward by a virtuous arguer, 
the goodness of the argument is not constituted by the virtues 
displayed by the arguer.  An agent-based account cannot replace 
a conventional account of argument.  However, we do not take 
this to mean that there is no future for virtue argumentation the-
ory. It is useful to think about the virtues of the good arguer; 
whether someone has them or not makes a difference to whether 
or not we should accept her premises. More broadly, the virtues 
of the good arguer and those of the good argument evaluator are 
ones we should want to develop in ourselves and encourage in 
others, and so we should think about what they are and about 
why they are virtues. 
 Which characteristics of an arguer might usefully be taken 
into account in the evaluation of her premises? We have already 
mentioned some: reliabilist virtues such as perceptual acuity, 
responsibilist virtues such as honesty. Linda Zagzebski provides 
a list of epistemic virtues which include further candidates: the 
ability to recognize the salient facts; sensitivity to detail; open-
mindedness; fairness; epistemic humility; perseverance; dili-
gence, care and thoroughness; the ability to recognise reliable 
authority; intellectual candour; intellectual courage, autonomy, 
boldness, creativity and inventiveness (1996, 114). These are 
epistemic virtues (the reliabilist and the responsibilist ones alike) 
because possessing them tends towards the believing and assert-
ing of truths. A person who is open-minded and epistemically 
humble will be prepared to revise her beliefs, even cherished 
beliefs, in the light of new evidence. A person who has intellec-
tual courage will be prepared to consider the possibility that un-
popular and unpalatable claims are true, and if the evidence for 
them is compelling, to put them forward even when it is obvious 
they will not be well-received. A person who is epistemically 
diligent (and skilled at argument evaluation) will carefully con-
sider the evidence for a claim before accepting it or passing it on 
to others. Knowing about these kinds of characteristics of an ar-
guer may in some cases legitimately influence our evaluation of 
their argument, because someone who lacks these characteristics 
is less likely to be someone who believes and asserts truths. 
However, in spite of its virtues as a theory informing the peda-
gogy of argumentation and a framework for thinking about spe-
cific instances of arguing, virtue argumentation theory cannot be 
the whole story when it comes to argument evaluation.5 
                                     
5Thanks to Jonathan McKeown-Green, Tim Dare, Stephanie Gibbons and the 
audience at a Waikato University Philosophy Seminar for their feedback on 
this paper. Thanks also to two anonymous referees for this journal, whose 
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